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The Dynamic Core and Global Workspace hypotheses were independently put forward to 
provide mechanistic and biologically plausible accounts of how brains generate conscious 
mental content.  The Dynamic Core proposes that reentrant neural activity in the thalamocortical 
system gives rise to conscious experience. Global Workspace reconciles the limited capacity of 
momentary conscious content with the vast repertoire of long-term memory. In this paper we 
show the close relationship between the two hypotheses. This relationship allows for a strictly 
biological account of phenomenal experience and subjectivity that is consistent with mounting 
experimental evidence. We examine the constraints on causal analyses of consciousness and 
suggest that there is now sufficient evidence to consider the design and construction of a 
conscious artifact.
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possessor to be conscious of being conscious. We emphasize this 
distinction to make the point that our overarching task here is 
to account in biological terms for primary consciousness. At the 
same time, such an account necessarily depends on investigation of 
human subjects, with their ability verbally to report, as the richest 
source of relevant data.
A summAry review
In the last decade a large number of observations and experiments 
have contributed to our understanding of consciousness (see for 
example, Velmans and Schneider, 2007; Zelazo et al., 2007). Here, 
our aim is to consider certain salient aspects of this work.
In the vertebrates, consciousness is a dynamic, integrated, mul-
timodal mental process entailed by physical events occurring in 
the forebrain. Plausibly, the neural structures and mechanisms 
underlying consciousness were selected during evolution because 
they allowed animals to plan and prepare for future eventualities. 
Conscious processes arise spontaneously and display intentionality, 
i.e., for the most part, each is about something (Brentano, 1973). 
At any given moment, this content comprises a unified “scene” that 
can be shaped either by a limited selection of exogenous sensory 
input, by endogenous constructs generated from stored memories, 
or by some combination of the two. Consciousness is necessar-
ily subjective and internal (Metzinger, 2003), but its contents can 
often be inferred from animal behavior or verbal report. In humans 
the contents of consciousness are substantially under autonomous 
regulation, i.e., we decide where to direct our sensory attention or 
thought processes (Knudsen, 2007). Consciousness of acts or feel-
ings seems to be essential for the laying down of long-term episodic 
memories (Tulving, 1987).
Much evidence shows that, in mammals, the neural structures 
required for specific conscious events include the thalamus and 
cerebral  cortex.  For  example,  researchers  using  brain-imaging 
techniques, e.g., fMRI (Norman et al., 2006) or magnetoencepha-
lography (MEG; Srinivasan et al., 1999), can often deduce with 
a significant degree of success the general nature of the contents 
of  a  subject’s  consciousness  from  the  anatomic  and  temporal 
introduction
Advances in neuroscience have now made it possible to study the 
biological basis of consciousness. Indeed, in recent years an increas-
ing amount of attention has been directed to this subject (Crick 
and Koch, 2003; Edelman, 2003; Velmans and Schneider, 2007; 
Zelazo et al., 2007). Our own efforts to account for key aspects of 
consciousness at a biological level have taken two forms. The first 
involved the proposal of a neuroscientifically based global brain 
theory commonly referred to as Neural Darwinism (Edelman, 1978, 
1987; Edelman and Tononi, 2000). This theory proposes the func-
tioning of a Dynamic Core generated by a neural process, reentry, 
to link dispersed cortical and thalamic areas and account for the 
relation between perception and conscious memory. The second 
theory (Baars, 1988) was propounded mainly from a cognitive psy-
chological point of view. This Global Workspace theory hypoth-
esizes that a number of brain components constitute an integrative 
workspace that serves to reconcile the narrow momentary capacity 
of conscious contents with a widespread recruitment of uncon-
scious brain functions, including long-term memory.
In the present account, we reconcile and expand on these early 
notions by considering consciousness as a biological phenomenon, 
one that is a product of both evolution and development. We believe 
that such a biological approach can address and even dispose of 
several concerns articulated by philosophers of mind and others. We 
propose that a biological account of consciousness does not require 
metaphysical proposals, mathematical reduction, or “strange phys-
ics.” We also maintain that previously argued categories such as 
selfhood and phenomenal experience can be explained biologically 
in terms of patterns of neural activity.
At the outset, it is important to distinguish primary sensori-
motor consciousness from higher-order consciousness (Edelman, 
1992, 2003). Primary consciousness occurs in animals lacking any 
linguistic capabilities, and is an essential process even in humans. 
After the invention of language it was possible to escape the “remem-
bered present” of primary consciousness by referring to internal 
linguistic tokens. As a result, possession of true language with syntax 
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of   evolving an instructive mechanism to govern this complex and 
variable process, it is necessary to invoke a selectional theory. Neural 
Darwinism, or the theory of neuronal group selection, is just such 
a theory (Edelman, 1987, 1993). It maintains that the brain gives 
rise to repertoires of variant neuronal groups of vast complexity 
and diversity. Selection from these repertoires of neuronal groups 
occurs to match the novelty and diversity of experience in an inte-
grative and adaptive fashion.
Neural Darwinism has three tenets:
(1) Developmental selection – During the development of the 
brain, neurons that fire together wire together. While there 
are a number of genetic constraints on the formation of brain 
circuits, a number of epigenetic processes leads to extensive 
individual variance. These circuits constitute a primary reper-
toire for further selection.
(2) Experiential selection – During development and after the 
formation  of  variant  neuroanatomy,  changes  in  synaptic 
strength result in the further selection of variant neuronal 
groups that is characteristic of individual experience, consti-
tuting a secondary repertoire. The distribution and magnitude 
of these changes are constrained by inborn value systems, a 
diverse set of neural circuits producing various neuromodu-
lators selected over evolutionary time.
(3) Reentry – Long-range, reciprocal, and massively parallel con-
nections from one brain area to another provide the dyna-
mic spatiotemporal coordination in circuits of groups that is 
necessary for integrated and adaptive conscious behavior.
extension of neurAl dArwinism to consciousness
As we have seen, the anatomy of the thalamocortical system pro-
vides an essential element in the neural mechanism underlying 
consciousness. A characteristic feature of the cerebral cortex is the 
presence of corticocortical connections linking various neurons in 
spatially dispersed regions of the cortex to one another in a recipro-
cal fashion (Fuster, 2008). Similarly, the thalamus projects a large 
number of axons to all areas of the cortex, and the cortex projects 
an even larger number to the thalamus (Jones, 2007). Together 
the corticocortical, corticothalamic, and thalamocortical connec-
tions provide a necessary structural basis for dynamic reentry, the 
ongoing reciprocal signaling within the cortex and between the 
cortex and the thalamus, constituting a Dynamic Core (Edelman 
and Tononi, 2000). Reentrant coupling can result in the forma-
tion of synchronous time-locked patterns of activity essential to 
connecting and integrating the distinctive functions of different 
brain areas. Reentrant activity allows a brain area having responses 
originally evoked by sensory input to give similar responses in the 
absence of that input. By this means the brain “speaks to itself,” a 
necessary basis for memory and thought.
We have proposed earlier (Edelman, 1989) that reentry between 
posterior, modality-specific cortical areas and more anterior areas 
related to memory and executive functions provides a mechanism 
for conscious processes. The observation that this Dynamic Core 
(Edelman and Tononi, 2000) necessarily involves integration of 
activity in widespread distributed cortical areas accords with the 
concept of a Global Workspace. Experimental evidence for a role 
for a Dynamic Core of cortical reentrant activity in conscious 
  distribution of neural activity generated in the subjects’ cortex. 
This is the case regardless of whether these contents are evoked 
endogenously or by sensory input (Kanwisher, 2010). Moreover, 
lesions in the thalamus or cortex, or disruptions of their normal 
functioning through various techniques, can disrupt the contents 
of consciousness (Bogen, 1995, 1997).
Nevertheless, not all patterns of neural activity in the thalamus 
or cortex relate to, or are necessary for consciousness. Inactivation 
or removal of large portions of these structures does not necessarily 
render an animal unconscious. Consciousness can also persist fol-
lowing the loss of large brain components, such as the hippocampus 
(Milner et al., 1968), the cerebellum (Verschuuren et al., 1996), 
the frontal cortex (Stookey et al., 1941), or even an entire cerebral 
hemisphere (Austin and Grant, 1956). By contrast, the thalamic 
intralaminar nuclei, which project axons widely to all cortical areas, 
are notable in that their destruction can result in a permanent loss 
of consciousness (Bogen, 1997).
The corticothalamic system of any living animal displays spon-
taneous patterns of neural activity whether that animal is conscious 
or not. From temporal correlations among fluctuations in such 
activity in various regions of the brain, one can infer the presence 
of networks mediating functional connectivity among these regions 
(Fox and Raichle, 2007). Anatomic networks of long-range axonal 
bundles allow this connectivity by providing critical bi-directional 
reentrant links among cortical areas and thalamic nuclei (Honey 
et al., 2009).
Microelectrode, EEG, and MEG measurements all support the 
hypothesis that when separate cortical areas contribute to the con-
tents of consciousness, they exhibit enhanced synchrony in the 
gamma frequency band (Engel and Singer, 2001) that may be phase-
locked to a slower theta rhythm (Buzsaki, 2006; Canolty et al., 2006). 
Areas and patches of such synchronous activity can be distributed 
widely across and within the cerebral hemispheres. These and other 
findings suggest that the physical bases of conscious states consist of 
spatially dispersed, but reentrantly interconnected, neuronal groups 
in a widely distributed set of brain areas (Baars, 1988; Edelman, 
2003) constituting a “Global Workspace.” Evidence also suggests 
that each separate area functions to process a distinctive feature 
of the overall conscious scene, and that synchrony serves to “bind” 
these features together into an apparently seamless whole (Engel 
and Singer, 2001).
the role of brAin theory
The  biological  account  presented  above  raises  the  problem  of 
describing how the features of consciousness can be related to 
brain structure and dynamics in a manner that is consistent with 
evolution. A theory of human consciousness, therefore, must rest 
on a more global theory of how vertebrate brains are organized to 
yield function.
To  contribute  to  our  understanding  of  consciousness,  such 
a global brain theory must be in accord with the extraordinary 
variety of the contents of consciousness. These contents are con-
structed from both internal memories and external stimuli, and 
necessarily reflect the complexity, ambiguity, and unpredictability 
of signals received from encounters with the world. Sampling and 
integrating that complexity requires brain mechanisms that can 
deal with endless and unforeseen novelty. Given the implausibility www.frontiersin.org  January 2011  | Volume 2  | Article 4  |  3
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  perception has been provided by studies of electromagnetic signals 
generated in the brains of subjects viewing two different, fluctuat-
ing stimuli, one in each eye (Srinivasan et al., 1999). At any time, 
the subject exhibits binocular rivalry, i.e., is conscious of only one 
percept; this alternates to the other percept every few seconds. As 
illustrated in Figure 1, conscious perception of a stimulus is corre-
lated with enhanced coherence among signals from multiple distant 
cortical areas constituting a Global Workspace. Presumably this 
synchrony is generated and maintained by the reentrant neural 
activity that contributes to the Dynamic Core.
Hierarchical recursive mapping by means of reentrant interac-
tions in the Dynamic Core provides a mechanism for the integra-
tion of diverse neural signals from widespread cortical areas that 
give rise to such integrated patterns of neural activity. At any given 
moment, a process of integration of collective neuronal activity 
generates an interwoven pattern of responses unique to a par-
ticular animal at that particular moment of time (Edelman and 
Tononi, 2000).
Dynamic changes in the core lead to a linked sequence of dis-
criminations. It has been proposed that the sequences of integrated 
activity in this discriminatory web give rise to the unitary conscious 
scenes that constitute phenomenal experience (Edelman, 1992). 
These temporal properties underlie what William James called the 
“stream of consciousness” (James, 1890). It has been suggested that 
a measure of the integration of information accounts for the pres-
ence of conscious experience (Tononi, 2005). However, no measure 
of integration alone can provide an exclusive account of the actual 
mechanisms that entail phenomenal conscious experience (Seth 
et al., 2006). Indeed, a number of other properties remain to be 
accounted for, requiring causal analysis of biological mechanisms. 
These include not only the temporal properties just mentioned, but 
also the intentionality or reference of conscious states (Brentano, 
1973), as well as their modulation by attention (Knudsen, 2007).
the GlobAl workspAce And consciousness
As a result of the growth and integration of cognitive and neuro-
scientific evidence, it is now evident that Global Workspace theory 
(Baars, 1988, 2002) is complementary to the Dynamic Core hypoth-
esis. Global Workspace theory reconciles the limited capacity of 
momentary conscious content with the vast repertoire of long-term 
memory. A global broadcast of focal conscious contents can be 
viewed as a momentary “snapshot” of Dynamic Core activity.
The psychological evidence for limited capacity of conscious 
contents was already very strong in the late 1980s (e.g., Baars, 
1988). However, the neurobiological evidence made it equally 
clear that there are brain-wide phenomena that are also asso-
ciated with consciousness, such as circadian state changes and 
event-related potentials. Limitations of the momentary capac-
ity of conscious contents present a puzzle, because intuitively 
it would seem that multiple conscious contents would allow 
animals to survive situations in which multiple food sources, or 
multiple predators, could be tracked simultaneously. Binocular 
FiGure 1 | results of a study of human whole-head 
magnetoencephalographic (MeG) signals evoked by visual stimuli that 
were binocularly rivalrous and frequency-tagged (Srinivasan et al., 1999). 
The topographic map indicates the magnitude of the MEG signal power at the 
frequency of the perceptually conscious dominant stimulus minus that at the 
same frequency when the same stimulus was non-dominant and non-
conscious. Conscious perception of a stimulus was associated with a significant 
increase in the calculated coherence between distant MEG channels at the 
frequency of the perceived stimulus. Pairs of MEG channels whose coherence 
changed with change in percept are connected in the figure by cyan straight 
lines. These data point to a role for increased synchrony among distinct and 
distant neuronal groups in the Global Workspace during conscious perception. 
Presumably, these widespread groups constituting the Workspace contribute to 
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perspective, one must take up the relationships among the brain, the 
body, and the world (Clark, 1996). For each individual animal, the 
brain is embodied and the body and the brain are both embedded in 
the environment. This behavioral trinity cannot be neglected, par-
ticularly when considering the evolution and development of the 
neural structures underlying the conscious process. According to 
Neural Darwinism (Edelman, 1992, 2003), these forebrain struc-
tures were selected for during evolution because they allowed for 
the planning of adaptive behavior in a complex, changing environ-
ment. In responding to any given econiche, the number of possible 
ways a brain might partition the environment is truly enormous. 
Furthermore, the complex environment is not a coded piece of tape; 
it contains dynamic and ambiguous events. As the brain and body 
respond to diverse sensory inputs and various memory systems, 
they must remain coordinated with one another.
Dynamic Core activity, with its hierarchical and recursive prop-
erties, generates conceptual content by integrating both perceptually 
driven and motor signals with stored memories. The fundamen-
tal tie to world signals in turn provides a basis for intentionality 
(Brentano, 1973). This proposed mechanism also allows for modu-
lation of core activity by attentional signals arising in subcortical 
structures projecting to the core, e.g., the cerebellum and the basal 
ganglia (Hikosaka et al., 1998).
Selection in the core occurs under the further constraint of neu-
romodulatory value systems located in the basal brain and brain 
stem. These diffuse ascending systems play a particularly important 
role in emotional responses, a key aspect of conscious phenomenal 
experience (Damasio and Dolan, 1999).
QuAliA, subjectivity, And the so-cAlled hArd 
problem
How can we account for qualia, subjectivity, and the self? According 
to the selectional theory based on the behavioral trinity, the expe-
rience of qualia occurs in each individual as a set of discrimi-
nations: “heat” is not “green,” “green” is not “touch,” etc. In this 
view, the complex unified scene at any given moment is a com-
posite of multiple different discriminations integrated within the 
Dynamic Core.
It has been proposed that no matter how adequately a biological 
account appears to explain perceptual categorization, memory, and 
various mechanistic aspects of how the brain works, we remain 
confounded by the so-called “hard problem”: an inability to explain 
in scientific terms the phenomenal “feel” of conscious experience 
(Chalmers, 1996). Indeed, many people consider this to be an essen-
tial and mysterious problem, one that cannot be solved. Unlike 
the subjects of other scientific accounts, phenomenal experience 
entails a first-person point of view, and the suggestion is that it 
cannot be explained by scientific means. Qualia, the felt contents 
of consciousness, are therefore concluded to be possibly beyond 
scientific explanation (Chalmers, 1996). Here, we will attempt to 
refute this position.
Although the brain and body interact with the external envi-
ronment, most neural and bodily responses necessarily develop 
within  a  single  individual’s  phenotype.  Thus,  as  in  the “hard 
problem” account, qualia are by necessity private. According to 
Neural  Darwinism,  qualia  reflect  higher-order  discriminations 
entailed by the workings of the Dynamic Core (Edelman, 2003). 
rivalry and binaural selective attention are two famous examples 
of the inability to integrate incompatible percepts at the same 
moment. The Global Workspace theory suggests that the limi-
tation on conscious integration has compensatory advantages. 
For a thirsty giraffe a 300-ms visual percept of a drinking hole 
may “broadcast” simultaneously to many brain areas, in order to 
update episodic memory, spatial maps, value systems, prefrontal 
planning, and motor preparation. In the Dynamic Core at any 
instant, a single conscious percept may activate numerous brain 
functions. In a more complex planning task, prefrontal activity 
involving envisioned goals may similarly prime the Dynamic Core 
in preparation for a suitable action.
The concept of a Dynamic Core provides a mechanism for 
Global Workspace events by reentrantly projecting neural signals 
throughout the cortex. The distributed neural activity that under-
lies conscious contents simultaneously projects one-way neural 
signals throughout the cortex. Such directed propagation of activity 
among widely dispersed large populations of cortical neurons is 
reflected in event-related potentials. Long-distance propagation 
of functional brain signals has been known for many years in the 
context of such potentials (Steriade, 2006). These observations sug-
gest that the concept of a Global Workspace is compatible with the 
notion that a brief pattern of activity in the Dynamic Core with 
a specific content, e.g., a particular mental image, momentarily 
activates numerous cortical areas.
An example is provided by the ventral visual stream, which 
is widely thought to underlie the content of visual conscious-
ness (Zeki, 1993). The evidence is strong that activity correlated 
with this stream is widely distributed throughout neocortical and 
medial temporal lobe pathways. There is direct evidence for such 
widespread propagation of neural events underlying visual con-
sciousness (Dehaene and Naccache, 2001; Doesburg et al., 2009). 
Particularly strong support for Baars’ proposal comes from the 
studies of Gaillard et al. (2009). Moreover, some prefrontal regions 
have been shown to contain visuotopical maps (McGaugh, 2000). 
These findings are consistent with the involvement of frontoparietal 
regions in giving rise to the contents of visual consciousness.
There is evidence to suggest the possibility that propagation of 
signals within the Dynamic Core may occur in integration intervals 
at a rate of approximately 10 Hz, and that, periodically, the core 
may switch dynamically from driving one population of neuronal 
groups in the core to driving another (Canolty et al., 2006). Neural 
activity required to construct conscious scenes also appears to occur 
over similar time intervals. Consistent with this time-scale, sensory 
events in the neocortex underlying conscious percepts are associ-
ated with EEG signals in the theta band. Since sensory and motor 
systems preserve spatiotopical mapping in many brain areas, many 
oscillatory signals may implicitly encode spatial information as well 
(Canolty et al., 2006).
the behAviorAl trinity: brAin, body, And world
Two fundamental issues arise in considering the particular brain 
mechanisms that give rise to consciousness. The first, touched on 
briefly above, concerns how these biological mechanisms can be 
related in detail to phenomenal experience (Nagel, 1974; Searle, 
1992). The second, and related, issue concerns the basis for the 
so-called subjective self. To consider these matters from a biological www.frontiersin.org  January 2011  | Volume 2  | Article 4  |  5
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the experimentAl chAllenGe And conscious 
ArtifActs
As we have briefly reviewed, a number of experiments performed in 
the last decade have shed light on several neural properties under-
lying conscious experience. The truly hard problem is to provide 
a biologically based mechanistic account of how, at molecular, 
cellular, and systemic levels, the brain actually functions to entail 
consciousness. We propose that core reentry provides the general 
mechanism for unifying the contents of the Global Workspace, 
but we are also aware that many important details still remain to 
be specified.
Given the complexity of the underlying anatomy and physiology, 
it is not surprising that research on the detailed causal bases of con-
sciousness has trailed far behind evidence for “neural correlates” of 
consciousness. One approach might mitigate this constraint: namely, 
building a conscious artifact (Fleischer et al., 2007, in press).
To justify such an enterprise, we must first accept that we are 
unable in a living animal to trace causal chains at all levels of com-
plexity in the brain circuits that contribute to consciousness. We 
simply cannot observe, nor causally explore and influence in vivo, 
the myriad dynamic biological mechanisms underlying conscious 
processes. Synthetic neural modeling (Reeke and Sporns, 1993) 
and the construction of brain-based devices provides us, however, 
with an opportunity to trace causal chains in ways that are not 
now possible in living animals (Fleischer et al., in press). Given the 
importance of the behavioral trinity, autonomous exploration of 
the environment and learning by a brain-based device, driven by 
a simulated brain incorporating a Global Workspace, a Dynamic 
Core, and a value system, would be key to success in such an enter-
prise. A critical benchmark would be the demonstration of imagery, 
such as mental rotation or “simulation” (Hesslow, 2002), as sugges-
tive of consciousness in the functioning of such an artifact.
A sticking point in such an endeavor relates to the number of 
simulated neurons and synapses that might be both necessary and 
sufficient in any synthetic neural model or conscious artifact. If it 
is necessary to simulate a workspace containing multiple millions 
of neurons and billions of synapses, modeling may be constrained 
by limits on processing speed and active memory capacity. But, so 
far, it appears that a much smaller number of simulated neurons 
and synapses (Fleischer et al., 2007) might prove sufficient to give 
rise to a particular mental property, such as imagery.
 conclusion And extensions
Consciousness consists of a stream of unified mental constructs that 
arise spontaneously from a material structure, the Dynamic Core 
in the brain. Consciousness is a concomitant of dynamic patterns 
of reentrant signaling within complex, widely dispersed, intercon-
nected neural networks constituting a Global Workspace.
The contents of consciousness, or qualia, are correlates of dis-
criminations made within this neural system. These discriminations 
are made possible by perceptions, motor activity, and memories – 
all of which shape, and are shaped by, the activity-dependent modu-
lations of neural connectivity and synaptic efficacies that occur as 
an animal interacts with its world.
The account given here can serve as a basis for formulating a 
number of unanswered critical questions concerning the regulation 
of the conscious process. A key question concerns the autonomous 
For example, to the conscious individual, the experience of blue 
can be distinguished from the experience of warmth, which can be 
distinguished from the experience of an odor. No possible descrip-
tion of a phenomenal experience would enable an unequipped 
individual lacking the proper brain structures, body, or exposure 
to the appropriate stimuli to have that phenomenal experience. 
Nonetheless, the correspondence between behavior and report of 
an individual’s qualia as discriminations can, to a large degree, be 
studied from a third-person point of view. Such a study can be 
carried out despite the privacy that is an entailed consequence of 
the properties of the behavioral trinity. It should be added that 
consciousness itself is not causal (Velmans, 1993; Kim, 2000). It 
is the neural structures underlying conscious experience that are 
causal. The conscious individual can therefore be described as 
responding to a causal illusion, one that is an entailed evolution-
ary outcome of selection for animals able to make plans involving 
multiple discriminations.
Once one recognizes that qualia cannot be causal but correspond 
to internal discriminations that are reliable correlates of underly-
ing causal neural mechanisms, the hard problem as a barrier to 
scientific explanation disappears. If qualia as discriminations are 
entailed in behaving agents by the Dynamic Core, in the absence 
of pathology that entailment is reliable and consistent.
We are left with another set of questions: who are these agents? 
Exactly “who” experiences qualia in a given body? Or, more suc-
cinctly, what is the self? In accordance with the behavioral trinity, 
the self emerges from brain responses to bodily signals arising in the 
sensorimotor system of an individual agent. These predominantly 
motor signals serve to distinguish the body’s sense of agency from 
signals evoked by the movement of another animal’s or agent’s 
body. This notion is consistent with the hypothesis that, in sensing 
agency, motor acts are evaluated internally by comparing signals 
from a feedforward model of perceptual signals to those arising 
from the body’s motion. In the absence of explicit motion, the 
same motor components are engaged when evoking an intent to 
move (Jeannerod, 2001) or where there is a mental “simulation” of 
an act (Hesslow, 2002). Such a system is constantly active, signal-
ing to the core from the earliest emergence of motor control and 
throughout the development of proprioceptive “bodily” sense. The 
  combination of such omnipresent sensorimotor signals to the core, 
and their distinctions that are contemporaneous with perceptual 
and memorial signals to the core, generates a sense of a self expe-
riencing a surrogate world.
The picture of entailed discriminations proposed here envisions 
a conscious animal capable of confronting a complex environment 
full of novelties, and posits that such discriminations give rise to 
behavior that is adaptive. While certain discriminations may arise 
unconsciously (Kouider and Dehaene, 2007), they would not, in 
general, be able to contribute to the planning under novel condi-
tions that incorporates the myriad distinctions made possible by 
the Dynamic Core and Global Workspace. As long as the illusory 
sense of conscious causation results in adaptive responses correlated 
with and informed by appropriate discriminative qualia, there is 
no issue with describing qualia as causal. Of course, we should 
recognize that actually they are entailed by neural activity. The 
foregoing considerations suggest that the hard problem does not 
require a solution, but rather, a cure.Frontiers in Psychology  |  Consciousness Research    January 2011  | Volume 2  | Article 4  |  6
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